Of Rattle-Tattle. and India’s ENR Battle: Sid Harth
The nuclear limit
There has been some heated discussion in the media about the latest decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to ban the supply of Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) equipment to India, despite the earlier Indo-US nuclear deal and the 2008 “clean waiver” accorded to India by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Fortunately, the three main suppliers (the US, Russia and France) have issued statements declaring their intent to honour all bilateral agreements. Let’s hope and pray that they honour their words with deeds and that India’s leadership is not led up the garden path yet again.
While India does have some limited indigenous ENR capability, it requires modern ENR facilities to ensure optimum use of the imported uranium. Why is ENR necessary? The answer to this lies in the peculiar process which low-enriched uranium-235 (U-235), (though initially in a critical mass in the reactor fuel core) undergoes during fission in a power reactor, wherein byproducts (called “poisons”) like iodine etc. are formed. These absorb neutrons, thereby making the reactor fuel core “sub critical” and incapable of generating power.
The problem is overcome by initially adding “excess reactivity” with more enriched U-235, to ensure a few more years of operation before reactor fuel change. Reactor fuel change is a complex process that requires stringent safety measures, including storage facility for used fuel (in Fukushima two reactors with used fuel stored were also affected by the earthquake and tsunami), before transporting it for reprocessing where plutonium-239 (Pu-239) is removed for use in either fast breeder reactors or for making weapons — this latter use is the worry of IAEA-NSG, as they fear that Indian scientists may reverse-engineer the latest ENR technology to upgrade existing indigenous ENR equipment to enhance their capacity or to build new “indigenous” ENR plants, both of which would not be under IAEA safeguards.
Also, some of the used U-235 can be isolated from the “poisons” and enriched for possible reuse, and this would need IAEA monitoring.
However, one cannot deny that India needs some nuclear power, despite Germany’s latest decision, post-Fukushima nuclear disaster, to have zero nuclear power by 2022. But we need to proceed with great caution and the realisation that nuclear power in India can never contribute more than 10 per cent to the national power grid, for reasons of safety, availability of highly specialised operators and economics. Nuclear safety lessons from the American Three Mile Island, the Soviet Chernobyl and the Japanese Fukushima accidents must be kept in mind, as also our inept handling of the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy.
There is no doubt that the March 11 nuclear disaster in earthquake-prone Japan was due to a combination of various factors, including faulty location of the reactors and the standby diesel generators for emergency reactor cooling, the flawed decision to delay use of sea water cooling.
Japan’s decision to decommission four of the six Fukushima reactors will not mean the end of nuclear emergency since these reactors, after being entombed in sand, lead and concrete, will require monitoring for a very long time because while some reactor “fission byproducts” like iodine have very short half-lives and decay quickly, others have very long half-lives, for example strontium-90 (29 years) and cesium-137 (30 years). The plutonium found in the soil in Fukushima has a half-life of 24,400 years.
I have always been a strong supporter of “limited” nuclear power (which would meet about 10 per cent of our energy needs), provided the nuclear plants are safely located (away from population centres and seismic zones), built as per the latest, stringent IAEA safety standards, are operated by skilled personnel and audited regularly for safety. In addition, I have always supported a strict Nuclear Liabilities Bill (NLB), an efficient National Disaster Management System (NDMS) with dedicated Nuclear Emergency Response Teams (NERT) and a three-minute automated Tsunami Warning System (TWS), unlike the present 30-minute Indian warning system which is reported to be non-operational due to pilferage of the buoys at sea by fishermen.
Despite the obvious lessons of the latest nuclear disaster in Japan, and the limitations of India’s NLB, NDMS, NERT and TWS, I am amazed that India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has reportedly projected a requirement of 6,55,000 MWe of nuclear power by 2050. This would involve setting up about 655 additional imported reactors of 1000 MWe each, in “nuclear parks” of about six reactors per “park” each.
Given mainland India’s 6,000 km coastline, India could have 109 “nuclear parks”, about 55 km apart, dotting its coastline, which would be a recipe for major disasters, given worries of tsunamis, earthquakes, or a terrorist strike. Given India’s total projected power need of 1350,000 MWe by 2050, the DAE-reported proposal to meet 50 per cent of the country’s energy needs by nuclear power, if indeed true, is sheer madness. It makes no sense, it is not safe and it is not affordable.
It’s time for sanity to return. A transparent public audit needs to be done of India’s nuclear safety standards, availability of skilled manpower, suitable non-seismic zone cum unpopulated site locations, as well as NDMS, NERT and TWS. If these audits are done properly, India may discover that it will be able to afford and set up about 40 reactors (of which half would be indigenous) by 2050.
The balance power requirements would require greater exploitation of renewable energy sources like solar, hydro and wind power, along with the traditional “heavyweights” like coal, which Australia is willing to export, unlike U-235. New technologies are available, though at present expensive, to deliver “clean energy” from coal.
The author, a vice-admiral, retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam
While India does have some limited indigenous ENR capability, it requires modern ENR facilities to ensure optimum use of the imported uranium. Why is ENR necessary? The answer to this lies in the peculiar process which low-enriched uranium-235 (U-235), (though initially in a critical mass in the reactor fuel core) undergoes during fission in a power reactor, wherein byproducts (called “poisons”) like iodine etc. are formed. These absorb neutrons, thereby making the reactor fuel core “sub critical” and incapable of generating power.
The problem is overcome by initially adding “excess reactivity” with more enriched U-235, to ensure a few more years of operation before reactor fuel change. Reactor fuel change is a complex process that requires stringent safety measures, including storage facility for used fuel (in Fukushima two reactors with used fuel stored were also affected by the earthquake and tsunami), before transporting it for reprocessing where plutonium-239 (Pu-239) is removed for use in either fast breeder reactors or for making weapons — this latter use is the worry of IAEA-NSG, as they fear that Indian scientists may reverse-engineer the latest ENR technology to upgrade existing indigenous ENR equipment to enhance their capacity or to build new “indigenous” ENR plants, both of which would not be under IAEA safeguards.
Also, some of the used U-235 can be isolated from the “poisons” and enriched for possible reuse, and this would need IAEA monitoring.
However, one cannot deny that India needs some nuclear power, despite Germany’s latest decision, post-Fukushima nuclear disaster, to have zero nuclear power by 2022. But we need to proceed with great caution and the realisation that nuclear power in India can never contribute more than 10 per cent to the national power grid, for reasons of safety, availability of highly specialised operators and economics. Nuclear safety lessons from the American Three Mile Island, the Soviet Chernobyl and the Japanese Fukushima accidents must be kept in mind, as also our inept handling of the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy.
There is no doubt that the March 11 nuclear disaster in earthquake-prone Japan was due to a combination of various factors, including faulty location of the reactors and the standby diesel generators for emergency reactor cooling, the flawed decision to delay use of sea water cooling.
Japan’s decision to decommission four of the six Fukushima reactors will not mean the end of nuclear emergency since these reactors, after being entombed in sand, lead and concrete, will require monitoring for a very long time because while some reactor “fission byproducts” like iodine have very short half-lives and decay quickly, others have very long half-lives, for example strontium-90 (29 years) and cesium-137 (30 years). The plutonium found in the soil in Fukushima has a half-life of 24,400 years.
I have always been a strong supporter of “limited” nuclear power (which would meet about 10 per cent of our energy needs), provided the nuclear plants are safely located (away from population centres and seismic zones), built as per the latest, stringent IAEA safety standards, are operated by skilled personnel and audited regularly for safety. In addition, I have always supported a strict Nuclear Liabilities Bill (NLB), an efficient National Disaster Management System (NDMS) with dedicated Nuclear Emergency Response Teams (NERT) and a three-minute automated Tsunami Warning System (TWS), unlike the present 30-minute Indian warning system which is reported to be non-operational due to pilferage of the buoys at sea by fishermen.
Despite the obvious lessons of the latest nuclear disaster in Japan, and the limitations of India’s NLB, NDMS, NERT and TWS, I am amazed that India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has reportedly projected a requirement of 6,55,000 MWe of nuclear power by 2050. This would involve setting up about 655 additional imported reactors of 1000 MWe each, in “nuclear parks” of about six reactors per “park” each.
Given mainland India’s 6,000 km coastline, India could have 109 “nuclear parks”, about 55 km apart, dotting its coastline, which would be a recipe for major disasters, given worries of tsunamis, earthquakes, or a terrorist strike. Given India’s total projected power need of 1350,000 MWe by 2050, the DAE-reported proposal to meet 50 per cent of the country’s energy needs by nuclear power, if indeed true, is sheer madness. It makes no sense, it is not safe and it is not affordable.
It’s time for sanity to return. A transparent public audit needs to be done of India’s nuclear safety standards, availability of skilled manpower, suitable non-seismic zone cum unpopulated site locations, as well as NDMS, NERT and TWS. If these audits are done properly, India may discover that it will be able to afford and set up about 40 reactors (of which half would be indigenous) by 2050.
The balance power requirements would require greater exploitation of renewable energy sources like solar, hydro and wind power, along with the traditional “heavyweights” like coal, which Australia is willing to export, unlike U-235. New technologies are available, though at present expensive, to deliver “clean energy” from coal.
The author, a vice-admiral, retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam
My dear Arun Kumar Singh,
For writing an article on the most controversial Nuclear Reprocessing Regimen in one single stroke, I give you, a Veer Chakra, oops, Param Veer Chakram. Oops, Award. A ward of some Indian asylum for the mad scientists you must be. However, the battle plans you suggested, and I quote:
“Fortunately, the three main suppliers (the US, Russia and France) have issued statements declaring their intent to honour all bilateral agreements. Let’s hope and pray that they honour their words with deeds and that India’s leadership is not led up the garden path yet again.You are kidding, are you? Any statement made by a foreign country would rethink their earlier policies when a push comes to shove. Moreover, the big daddy, oops, Uncle Sam can be patient so much. If one just observes USA’s previous behavior, they are going to put pressure upon these three nuclear nations, one way or other.
Let us say, they may or they may not. Depends upon which party is going to win the next general, oops, presidential election. If barack Husein Obama wins it and he wants India to be behaving like a good little, third world, third rate country and buys from USA more military, industrial and consumer products with or without mental reservation and not encouraging other European countries like Germany, France, Great Britain to have secret dealings not approved by the NSG top dogs, things would sour for India’s superpower dream, oops, a day dream.
Have a nice day.
…and I am Sid harth@mysistereileen.com
Copyright © 2011 Deccan Chronicle. All rights reserved. For reprint rights: Deccan Chronicle Service
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This article has been cited by 4 ACS Journal articles (4 most recent appear below).
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The Future of Nuclear Power The U.S.–and the world–is gearing up to build a potentially massive fleet of new nuclear reactors, in part to fight climate change. But can nuclear power handle the load? » January 26, 2009
LA HAGUE, on France’s Normandy coast, hosts a large complex that reprocesses spent fuel from nuclear power plants, extracting its plutonium for fabrication into new fuel. The U.S. Depart�ment of Energy has recently proposed building a similar facility. Image: Martin Bond: Photo Researchers, Inc.
Although a dozen years have elapsed since any new nuclear power reactor has come online in the U.S., there are now stirrings of a nuclear renaissance. The incentives are certainly in place: the costs of natural gas and oil have skyrocketed; the public increasingly objects to the greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels; and the federal government has offered up to $8 billion in subsidies and insurance against delays in licensing (with new laws to streamline the process) and $18.5 billion in loan guarantees. What more could the moribund nuclear power industry possibly want?
Just one thing: a place to ship its used reactor fuel. Indeed, the lack of a disposal site remains a dark cloud hanging over the entire enterprise. The projected opening of a federal waste storage repository in Yucca Mountain in Nevada (now anticipated for 2017 at the earliest) has already slipped by two decades, and the cooling pools holding spent fuel at the nation’s nuclear power plants are running out of space.
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Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School December 2003
Authors: Bob van der Zwaan, Former Research Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Research Group/Project on Managing the Atom Project/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2001-2005, John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program (on leave), Steve Fetter, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Belfer Center Programs or Projects: International Security; Science, Technology, and Public Policy; Managing the Atom
Executive Summary
For decades, there has been an intense debate over the best approach to managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, whether it is better to dispose of it directly in geologic repositories, or reprocess it to recover and recycle the plutonium and uranium, disposing only of the wastes from reprocessing and recycling. The relative costs of reprocessing vs. not reprocessing are one important element of these debates. Economics is not the only or even the principal factor affecting decisions concerning reprocessing today. But economics is not unimportant, particularly in a nuclear industry facing an increasingly competitive environment. At a minimum, if reprocessing is being done to achieve objectives other than economic ones, it is worthwhile to know how much one is paying to achieve those other objectives.
While some analysts have argued in recent years that the costs of reprocessing and direct disposal are similar, and that reprocessing will soon be the more cost-effective approach as uranium prices increase, the data and analyses presented in this report demonstrate that the margin between the cost of reprocessing and recycling and that of direct disposal is wide, and is likely to persist for many decades to come. In particular:
• At a reprocessing price of $1000 per kilogram of heavy metal (kgHM), and with our other central estimates for the key fuel cycle parameters, reprocessing and recycling plutonium in existing light-water reactors (LWRs) will be more expensive than direct disposal of spent fuel until the uranium price reaches over $360 per kilogram of uranium (kgU).a price that is not likely to be seen for many decades, if then.
• At a uranium price of $40/kgU (comparable to current prices), reprocessing and recycling at a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM would increase the cost of nuclear electricity by 1.3 mills/kWh. Since the total back-end cost for the direct disposal is in the range of 1.5 mills/kgWh, this represents more than an 80% increase in the costs attributable to spent fuel management (after taking account of appropriate credits or charges for recovered plutonium and uranium from reprocessing).
• These figures for breakeven uranium price and contribution to the cost of electricity are conservative, because, to ensure that our conclusions were robust, we have assumed:
- A central estimate of reprocessing cost, $1000/kgHM, which is substantially below the cost that would pertain in privately financed facilities with identical costs and capacities to the large commercial facilities now in operation.
- A central estimate of plutonium fuel fabrication cost, $1500/kgHM, which is significantly below the price actually offered to most utilities in the 1980s and 1990s.
- Zero charges for storage of separated plutonium or removal of americium.
- Zero additional security, licensing, or shut-down expenses for the use of plutonium fuels in existing reactors.
- A full charge for 40 years of interim storage in dry casks for all fuel going to direct disposal, and no interim storage charge for fuel going to reprocessing.
Even though most new reactors are built with storage capacity for their lifetime fuel generation, so few additional costs for interim storage need be incurred.
- Geological disposal of spent MOX fuel at the same cost as disposal of spent LEU fuel.
• Reprocessing and recycling plutonium in fast-neutron reactors (FRs) with an additional capital cost, compared to new LWRs, of $200/kWe installed will not be economically competitive with a once-through cycle in LWRs until the price of uranium reaches some $340/kgU, given our central estimates of the other parameters. Even if the capital cost of new FRs could be reduced to equal that of new LWRs, recycling in FRs would not be economic until the uranium price reached some $140/kgU.
• At a uranium price of $40/kgU, electricity from a plutonium-recycling FR with an additional capital cost of $200/kWe, and with our central estimates of the other parameters, would cost more than 7 mills/kWh more than electricity from a oncethrough LWR. Even if the additional capital cost could be eliminated, the extra electricity cost would be over 2 mills/kWh.
• As with reprocessing and recycling in LWRs, these figures on breakeven uranium price and extra electricity cost for FRs are conservative, as we have assumed:
- Zero cost for providing start-up plutonium for the FRs.
- Zero additional cost for reprocessing higher-plutonium-content FR fuel.
- Zero additional cost for manufacturing higher-plutonium-content FR fuel.
- Zero additional operations and maintenance costs for FRs, compared to LWRs.
• Costs for the far more complex chemical separations processes and more difficult fuel fabrication processes needed for more complete separation and transmutation of nuclear wastes would be substantially higher than those estimated here for traditional reprocessing. Therefore the extra electricity cost, were these approaches to be pursued, would be even higher. Arguments for separations and transmutation to limit the need for additional repositories rest on a number of critical assumptions that may or may not be borne out in practice.
• World resources of uranium likely to be economically recoverable in future decades at prices far below the breakeven price amount to tens of millions of tons, probably enough to fuel a rapidly-growing nuclear enterprise using a once-through fuel cycle for a century or more.
In this report, we have focused only on the economic issues, and have not examined other issues in the broader debate over reprocessing. Nevertheless, given (a) the costs outlined above; (b) the significant proliferation concerns that have been raised (particularly with respect to those reprocessing approaches that result in fully separated plutonium suitable for use in nuclear explosives); and (c) the availability of safe, proven, low-cost dry cask storage technology that will allow spent fuel to be stored for many decades, the burden of proof clearly rests on those in favor of investing in reprocessing in the near term.
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Use of Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry in Nuclear Forensic Analysis for the Characterization of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Particles
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European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, P.O. Box 2340, 76125 Karlsruhe, Germany
Anal. Chem., 1999, 71 (14), pp 2616–2622
DOI: 10.1021/ac981184r
Publication Date (Web): June 10, 1999
Copyright © 1999 American Chemical Society
Abstract
The application of secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) analysis is described for the characterization of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) particles with a diameter to 10 μm. Applying a method previously described, particles of HEU could be detected in a scrap material, together with natural uranium. The isotopic composition of the particles was measured with a typical accuracy and precision of 0.5%. The spectrum of the trace elements in the uranium particles was also recorded. From the results it was possible to deduce that the uranium oxide, as UO2, was produced via a pyrochemical process. In a sample consisting of a mixture of three different species of particles, two of these were identified as plutonium particles. They were characterized according to their isotopic ratio 239/240 as well as to their dimension and shape. The results obtained by SIMS for the isotopic ratio were compared with those obtained analyzing the particles by Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS). The shape and dimensions were confirmed by the analysis with Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM). In both the cases the results obtained by SIMS were in good agreement with those from TIMS and SEM.
Citing Articles
View all 24 citing articlesCitation data is made available by participants in CrossRef’s Cited-by Linking service. For a more comprehensive list of citations to this article, users are encouraged to perform a search in SciFinder.
This article has been cited by 4 ACS Journal articles (4 most recent appear below).
Production and Characterization of Monodisperse Plutonium, Uranium, and Mixed Uranium−Plutonium Particles for Nuclear Safeguard Applications
Y. Ranebo, N. Niagolova, N. Erdmann, M. Eriksson, G. Tamborini and M. BettiAnalytical Chemistry2010 82 (10), 4055-4062
Resonance and Nonresonant Laser Ionization of Sputtered Uranium Atoms from Thin Films and Single Microparticles:
Evaluation of a Combined System for Particle Trace AnalysisNicole Erdmann, Maria Betti, Felix Kollmer, Alfred Benninghoven, Carsten Grüning, Vicky Philipsen, Peter Lievens, Roger E. Silverans, and Erno VandeweertAnalytical Chemistry2003 75 (13), 3175-3181-
Oxygen Isotopic Measurements by Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry in Uranium Oxide Microparticles:
A Nuclear Forensic DiagnosticG. Tamborini, D. Phinney, O. Bildstein, and M. BettiAnalytical Chemistry2002 74 (23), 6098-6101 
Distribution and Retention of 137Cs in Sediments at the Hanford Site, Washington
James P. McKinley, Cynthia J. Zeissler, John M. Zachara, R. Jeffrey Serne, Richard M. Lindstrom, Herbert T. Schaef, and Robert D. OrrEnvironmental Science & Technology2001 35 (17), 3433-3441
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See Inside Nuclear Fuel Recycling: More Trouble Than It’s Worth
Plans are afoot to reuse spent reactor fuel in the U.S. But the advantages of the scheme pale in comparison with its dangers
By Frank N. von Hippel | April 28, 2008 | 28 The Future of Nuclear Power The U.S.–and the world–is gearing up to build a potentially massive fleet of new nuclear reactors, in part to fight climate change. But can nuclear power handle the load? » January 26, 2009
LA HAGUE, on France’s Normandy coast, hosts a large complex that reprocesses spent fuel from nuclear power plants, extracting its plutonium for fabrication into new fuel. The U.S. Depart�ment of Energy has recently proposed building a similar facility. Image: Martin Bond: Photo Researchers, Inc.In Brief
- Spent nuclear fuel contains plutonium, which can be extracted and used in new fuel.
- To reduce the amount of long-lived radioactive waste, the U.S. Department of Energy has proposed reprocessing spent fuel in this way and then “burning” the plutonium in special reactors.
- But reprocessing is very expensive. Also, spent fuel emits lethal radiation, whereas separated plutonium can be handled easily. So reprocessing invites the possibility that terrorists might steal plutonium and construct an atom bomb.
- The author argues against reprocessing and for storing the waste in casks until an underground repository is ready.
Just one thing: a place to ship its used reactor fuel. Indeed, the lack of a disposal site remains a dark cloud hanging over the entire enterprise. The projected opening of a federal waste storage repository in Yucca Mountain in Nevada (now anticipated for 2017 at the earliest) has already slipped by two decades, and the cooling pools holding spent fuel at the nation’s nuclear power plants are running out of space.
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Belfer Center Home > Publications > Academic Papers & Reports > Reports > The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School December 2003Authors: Bob van der Zwaan, Former Research Associate, Energy Technology Innovation Research Group/Project on Managing the Atom Project/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2001-2005, John P. Holdren, Former Director and Faculty Chair, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program (on leave), Steve Fetter, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Belfer Center Programs or Projects: International Security; Science, Technology, and Public Policy; Managing the Atom
Executive Summary
For decades, there has been an intense debate over the best approach to managing spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, whether it is better to dispose of it directly in geologic repositories, or reprocess it to recover and recycle the plutonium and uranium, disposing only of the wastes from reprocessing and recycling. The relative costs of reprocessing vs. not reprocessing are one important element of these debates. Economics is not the only or even the principal factor affecting decisions concerning reprocessing today. But economics is not unimportant, particularly in a nuclear industry facing an increasingly competitive environment. At a minimum, if reprocessing is being done to achieve objectives other than economic ones, it is worthwhile to know how much one is paying to achieve those other objectives.
While some analysts have argued in recent years that the costs of reprocessing and direct disposal are similar, and that reprocessing will soon be the more cost-effective approach as uranium prices increase, the data and analyses presented in this report demonstrate that the margin between the cost of reprocessing and recycling and that of direct disposal is wide, and is likely to persist for many decades to come. In particular:
• At a reprocessing price of $1000 per kilogram of heavy metal (kgHM), and with our other central estimates for the key fuel cycle parameters, reprocessing and recycling plutonium in existing light-water reactors (LWRs) will be more expensive than direct disposal of spent fuel until the uranium price reaches over $360 per kilogram of uranium (kgU).a price that is not likely to be seen for many decades, if then.
• At a uranium price of $40/kgU (comparable to current prices), reprocessing and recycling at a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM would increase the cost of nuclear electricity by 1.3 mills/kWh. Since the total back-end cost for the direct disposal is in the range of 1.5 mills/kgWh, this represents more than an 80% increase in the costs attributable to spent fuel management (after taking account of appropriate credits or charges for recovered plutonium and uranium from reprocessing).
• These figures for breakeven uranium price and contribution to the cost of electricity are conservative, because, to ensure that our conclusions were robust, we have assumed:
- A central estimate of reprocessing cost, $1000/kgHM, which is substantially below the cost that would pertain in privately financed facilities with identical costs and capacities to the large commercial facilities now in operation.
- A central estimate of plutonium fuel fabrication cost, $1500/kgHM, which is significantly below the price actually offered to most utilities in the 1980s and 1990s.
- Zero charges for storage of separated plutonium or removal of americium.
- Zero additional security, licensing, or shut-down expenses for the use of plutonium fuels in existing reactors.
- A full charge for 40 years of interim storage in dry casks for all fuel going to direct disposal, and no interim storage charge for fuel going to reprocessing.
Even though most new reactors are built with storage capacity for their lifetime fuel generation, so few additional costs for interim storage need be incurred.
- Geological disposal of spent MOX fuel at the same cost as disposal of spent LEU fuel.
• Reprocessing and recycling plutonium in fast-neutron reactors (FRs) with an additional capital cost, compared to new LWRs, of $200/kWe installed will not be economically competitive with a once-through cycle in LWRs until the price of uranium reaches some $340/kgU, given our central estimates of the other parameters. Even if the capital cost of new FRs could be reduced to equal that of new LWRs, recycling in FRs would not be economic until the uranium price reached some $140/kgU.
• At a uranium price of $40/kgU, electricity from a plutonium-recycling FR with an additional capital cost of $200/kWe, and with our central estimates of the other parameters, would cost more than 7 mills/kWh more than electricity from a oncethrough LWR. Even if the additional capital cost could be eliminated, the extra electricity cost would be over 2 mills/kWh.
• As with reprocessing and recycling in LWRs, these figures on breakeven uranium price and extra electricity cost for FRs are conservative, as we have assumed:
- Zero cost for providing start-up plutonium for the FRs.
- Zero additional cost for reprocessing higher-plutonium-content FR fuel.
- Zero additional cost for manufacturing higher-plutonium-content FR fuel.
- Zero additional operations and maintenance costs for FRs, compared to LWRs.
• Costs for the far more complex chemical separations processes and more difficult fuel fabrication processes needed for more complete separation and transmutation of nuclear wastes would be substantially higher than those estimated here for traditional reprocessing. Therefore the extra electricity cost, were these approaches to be pursued, would be even higher. Arguments for separations and transmutation to limit the need for additional repositories rest on a number of critical assumptions that may or may not be borne out in practice.
• World resources of uranium likely to be economically recoverable in future decades at prices far below the breakeven price amount to tens of millions of tons, probably enough to fuel a rapidly-growing nuclear enterprise using a once-through fuel cycle for a century or more.
In this report, we have focused only on the economic issues, and have not examined other issues in the broader debate over reprocessing. Nevertheless, given (a) the costs outlined above; (b) the significant proliferation concerns that have been raised (particularly with respect to those reprocessing approaches that result in fully separated plutonium suitable for use in nuclear explosives); and (c) the availability of safe, proven, low-cost dry cask storage technology that will allow spent fuel to be stored for many decades, the burden of proof clearly rests on those in favor of investing in reprocessing in the near term.
- repro-report.pdf (2 MB PDF)
For more information about this publication please contact the MTA Project Coordinator at 617-495-4219.
For Academic Citation:
Bunn, Matthew, Steve Fetter, John Holdren, and Bob van der Zwaan. The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel. Cambridge, Mass.: Report for Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, December 2003.
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Reprocessing of nuclear fuel and plutonium breeder commercialization: implications of deferral
Analyzes implications of deferred light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel reprocessing upon the availability and cost of plutonium needed for liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) commercialization. The analysis is predicated upon the assumption that U.S. commercial reprocessing of nuclear fuel would not otherwise proceed, because of U.S. weapons antiproliferation policies or because of findings that the near-term economic benefits of reprocessing for recycle of uranium and fissile plutonium in LWRs are either small or nonexistent. As background, this paper reviews U.S. government policies on deferral of commercial-scale reprocessing and plutonium breeding reactors, and summarizes prior U.S. economic cost/benefit analyses, all of which indicate small benefits, if any, of investment in reprocessing for recycle in a LWR economy. The paper models the time and capacity of commercial-scale LWR reprocessing facilities and the associated minimum present discounted costs that would support a decision to proceed with U.S. LMFBR commercialization at a later time.
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